

SANTIAGO – CHILE - JULIO 30-31, 2019

XI Jornadas Técnicas ABB en Chile

Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Ivan Granados - Chile

ABB

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
Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Indice

- Estado de la ciberseguridad industrial
- El impacto de un ciberataque
- Los desafíos de la ciberseguridad
- Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS
- Servicios digitales de ABB

3 stages to protect digital systems

People process and technology: each must be leveraged to protect digital systems



People

- People are critical in preventing and protecting against cyber threats
- Organizations need competent people to implement and sustain cyber security technology and processes



Process

- Policies and procedures are key for an effective security strategy
- Processes should adapt to changes as cyber threats evolve



Technology

- Technology is important in preventing and mitigating cyber risks
- Technology needs people, processes and procedures to mitigate risks

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Objetivo

Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Objetivo

- Evolucion de los ciberataques en la ultima decada
- Impacto de un incidente de ciberseguridad
- Modelos de seguridad aplicados a ICS
- Ciberseguridad como un proceso


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Estado de la ciberseguridad industrial

Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Estado de la ciberseguridad industrial

- La ciberseguridad industrial es una prioridad, pero...
- Desconexión entre la percepción y la realidad.
- Incremento en incidentes de ciberseguridad
- Fuentes principales de amenaza
- Ataques no sofisticados



Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Estado de la ciberseguridad industrial

	2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none">First publicly-known example of a cyber weaponDesigned to disrupt the Iranian nuclear development programA self-propagating application (a "worm") spread via USB drives and network connectionsIt took over the PLC controlling the uranium enrichment centrifuges and ultimately caused these to break down at an accelerated rateIt was able to operate undetected for an extended period of time
	2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Second confirmed case of a cyber attack causing physical damageAttackers used a spearphishing campaign to capture user credentialsThey connected through the business systems to the OT networkCaused massive damage when a blast furnace had to be shut down abnormally
	2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Victims from multiple industries, including energy, manufacturing and pharmaceuticalsMalware campaign using multiple attack vectorsThese were spearphishing, waterhole poisoning, and replacing suppliers' support websitesInstalled a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) on systems inside targets' networksRATs coordinated and updated via the internet

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Estado de la ciberseguridad industrial



2015 and 2016
Ukraine Power
Grid



2017
TRITON/TRISIS



WannaCry

- Blackouts to parts of the Ukrainian grid in December 2015 and 2016
- In 2015 approximately 30 substations were shut down
- The attackers infiltrated production SCADA networks of 3 power companies
- Workstations and servers were infected with malware
- Reconnaissance carried out over an extended period of time
- Other actions further disrupted restoration efforts
- The 2016 incident utilized an automatable tool; reconnaissance activities carried out independently
- Analysis showed that its full capabilities were not used

- Attack on Saudi Petrochemical plant
- First malware to specifically target human life
- Operators first notified when system went down
- Shutdown was not intended
- They could have simply uploaded flawed code to shutdown system
- Made several attempts to deliver functioning code to cause serious damage
- Researchers have tracked the actor in other systems
- Cyber Security best practices would likely have prevented this attack

- Ransomware attack that impacted Windows servers, specifically around vulnerabilities in system updates
- Requested Bitcoin payment from victims
- Parts of the UK's NHS were infected, as well as Spain's Telefónica, FedEx and Deutsche Bahn
- It was a known vulnerability that could have been solved with patch management


Prevention was possible in all of these cases if proper security controls were in place

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
El impacto de un ciberataque

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El impacto de un ciberataque




- Stuxnet – June 2010
- How does it spread?
 - USB Drives
 - WinCC via hardcoded password
 - Network Shares
 - MS10-061 Print Spooler vulnerability (0day at the time)
 - MS08-067 SMB vulnerability
 - Step7 Projects



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El impacto de un ciberataque

- Industroyer / CrashOverride - Ukrainian Power System Attack – 2015 & 2016
 - Issues breaker commands
 - IEC101
 - IEC104
 - IEC 61850
 - OLE for Process Control (OPC)
 - Command and Control (C2C) Capabilities
 - Launcher executed with direct access to SCADA Network
 - Internal proxy listener – attack vector not publicly disclosed
 - Device scanning tools
 - Data destruction tools
 - Extendable framework



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El impacto de un ciberataque


- Triconex Emergency Shutdown System - 2017
 - Controller Code Vulnerability.
 - Key Switch bit in unprotected memory.
 - First known malware that could kill people.
 - 6 controllers involved.
 - RDP sessions into Engineering workstations from IT network.
 - Poorly configured DMZ.
 - VPN compromised and infiltrated.
 - Unprecedented public sharing of attack findings by vendor.



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El impacto de un ciberataque

Sources from which malicious code penetrates industrial networks
(image courtesy of Securityincidents.net)



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Los desafíos de la ciberseguridad

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Los desafíos de la ciberseguridad

Reality


There is no such thing as 100% or absolute security

Process

Cyber security is not destination but an evolving target – it is not a product but a process

Balance

Cyber security is about finding the right balance – it impacts usability and increases cost



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Los desafíos de la ciberseguridad

Common Threats in Operational Technology

- Legacy Software
- Default Configuration
- Lack of Encryption
- Remote Access Policies
- Policies and Procedures
- Lack of Network Segmentation
- DDoS Attacks
- Web Application Attacks
- Malware
- Command Injection and Parameters Manipulation

Version		End of mainstream	End of extended*
Windows XP	SP 3	4/14/2009	4/8/2014
Windows Vista	SP 2	4/10/2012	4/11/2017
Windows 7	SP 1	1/13/2015	1/14/2020
Windows Server 2008	R2	1/13/2015	1/14/2020
Windows 8	Windows 8.1	1/9/2018	1/10/2023
Windows 10		10/13/2020	10/14/2025


***End of extended: Security and non-security updates are no longer provided**

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


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


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





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


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


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


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Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS


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Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS

	Traditional IT	Industrial IOT
What is being Protected	Data	Physical Process
Impact Area	Disclosure of information; Financial Loss	Safety, Availability, Financial, Environment
Security Objective	Confidentiality, Privacy	Availability, Integrity
Operating Systems	Windows, Linux, ...	Windows at HMI, RTOS at field devices
Availability Requirements	99%	99.9% - 99.999% (downtime per year: 8.76 hours to 5.26 min)
System Lifetime	3 – 10 Years	5 – 25 Years
Logging and Forensics	Standard practice	Limited
Patching	Standard schedule; can be expedited	Non-standard; could be a long time between updates

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

Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS



Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS

- Physical Security
- Procedures and Policies
- Microsoft Firewall
- Computer Policies
- Account Management
- Security Updates
- Antivirus Solutions



Protect Against
Security Threats

Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS

- Network Segmentation
- Logging
- Backups of critical software installers including a SHA256 digital hash
- Securely stored backups of project files and device configuration files with appropriate digital hashes
- Test and apply patches when operations schedules allow, prioritize based on greatest impact
- Limit remote connections
- Limit access privileges required
- Two form authentication on remote connections
- Identify communication protocols in use, ensure legacy protocol support, eliminate unused protocols

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Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS

- Application Whitelisting
- DMZ
- Central logging and data aggregation
- Endpoint security technologies
- Intrusion detection systems

Ciberseguridad en sistemas de control industrial

Medidas base de seguridad para un ICS


- Train defenders to hunt for odd communications patterns (new IP comms, abnormal ICS protocol communications)
- At network traffic choke points, ensure network captures are collected, baselined and analysed to identify anomalous communications. Monitor all outbound.
- Network security monitoring.
- Plan and train incident response for IT/OT personnel, gather forensic evidence while restoring operations.
- On detection of suspicious activity, disable all unnecessary remote access connections.
- Backup and recovery tools.

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Servicios digitales de ABB


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
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Servicios digitales de ABB



Cyber Security Fingerprint

Diagnose



Overview

Provides a comprehensive view of your site's control systems cyber security status based on predefined KPI's for procedures and protocols, Group security policies and computer settings.

Identifies strengths and weaknesses for defending against an attack within your plant's control systems, both ABB and none-ABB systems.

The fingerprint is carried out by ABB.

The survey output is analyzed by ABB experts, who report the results and suggest improvements.


Supplies a solid foundation from which to build a sustainable cyber security strategy.



Security Update and Antivirus

Protect

Security Update Process



Benefits

Should I patch my QCS systems? YES

Manual options through **My Control System (MCS)**

Centralize the solution - WSUS and ePO

Enhanced security against possible cyber threats and malware

Minimize delays of security updates after validation

- Systems are updated according to ABB's recommendation

Increased protection of investment and intellectual property

Fulfils Security regulation and insurances requirements

Increased productivity

- **Highly automated process** with minimized user efforts

- No error prone manual work

ABB Security Workplace

Ensure control system security without impact to safety, process or availability



— Protect

Automates routine security maintenance tasks and provides operators with control and visibility into patch level, frequency of backups and key hardening measures.

Secure, backup and recover

- Offline patch management utility
- Identify missing and unqualified patches
- Antivirus, disaster recovery and whitelisting
- Configure and automates backup routines and schedules
- Details system hardening status and secured deployment
- Status monitoring dashboard prioritizes details for each node with stoplight color coded indicators
- Supports System 800xA and Symphony Plus

Scope of supply

- Management console automates deployment of patches that have been tested and validated for ABB control systems
- McAfee centrally managed endpoint protection against virus and spyware
- Installed by ABB cyber security experts
- Software maintenance updates during the subscription period


ABB Cyber Security

ABB Solutions vs Manual Updates

Average System Update Time

- Security Update Hours based on 10 servers and 12 clients
- Security Update Hours based on Patching on a monthly basis
- Antivirus Definitions updated monthly
 - SUS Daily

Monthly Security Update Hours



Backup and Recovery Management

Implement


PUBLIC

Overview

If the worst does happen, and cyber-attack or natural disaster strikes, then ABB's backup and emergency response services enable a rapid recovery to normal operations.

This service includes **implementation of management systems that handle backup and restore.**

ABB's back-up solutions ensure the **integrity, and availability, of critical data and the system**, no matter what happens to the original.



Device Control

Protect

PUBLIC

Overview

Utilizing an extension of the Centralized Antivirus Solution to prevent unauthorized use of removable media. As part of the McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator, **Device Control** offers event monitoring and incident management in real-time.

Device Control enables the customer to monitor and control data transfers from all desktop and laptop machines, **even when they are not connected to the network**.

This service includes **implementation and deployment of agents that handle removable media security**.

ABB's Device Control solution ensures **only approved removable media**, have access to the system.



Whitelisting and Application Control

Protect

Antivirus: Blacklisting	Application: Whitelisting
Block “known” malware	Allow known SW to run
Ongoing battle	Easier task

- Central Management and Distribution:
 - Application Certificates
 - Policies (Monitor/Block)
 - Log collection
- Premade Application Certificates for
 - Windows and other required 3rd party SW
 - ABB SW





ABB Ability™ Cyber Security Asset Inventory

Detect

ABB Ability™ Cyber Security Asset Inventory uses technology that automatically identifies and captures information from cyber assets such as computers, network components, controllers, remote I/Os, instruments, analyzers, HMIs, printers and other assets connected to the control system network.

Cyber Asset Inventory provides up-to-date information on control networks, and can help in decision-making on issues of cyber security, asset lifecycle and asset management.



Cyber Security Asset Inventory provides a clear path to users

Web based User Interface

- ✓ Only authenticated users get access
- ✓ Data from network or devices are seamlessly displayed
- ✓ Users navigate data and go from over views details
- ✓ Views can be filtered and sorted.
- ✓ Search for a specific application* among all assets is possible
- ✓ Data can be exported and printed
- ✓ Event list that shows added, removed and updated assets is generated
- ✓ Connection to company email server to send notifications to users is possible

Asset Inventory

NAME	DEVICE TYPE	LAST UPDATE	IP ADDRESS	DOMAIN
host123456	dns_server	01/05/2018 10:47:04 AM	192.168.1.10	
host123457	Windows_01	01/05/2018 10:47:04 AM	192.168.1.14	
host123458	Windows_02	01/05/2018 10:47:04 AM	192.168.1.6	
host123459	Windows_03	01/05/2018 10:47:04 AM	192.168.1.20	W192.168.1.20
host123460	Soundshare Server	01/05/2018 10:47:04 AM	192.168.1.18	W192.168.1.18

Asset Details


APPLICATION NAME	APPLICATION VENDOR	APPLICATION VERSION
ABB Authentication Service 2.22.0072.0	ABB	2.22.0072.0
ABB SDN4000	ABB	1.0.000.25102
ABB Serial Logger (0.0.0.0)	ABB	0.0.0.0.0
ABB System Data Monitor SDM4000	ABB	1.0.000.25102
ABB Modbus Agent	ABB	1.1.1.2
ABB 6000 series IPD Connectivity Toolkit Ver 3.1.2.0	ABB Asset Browser B.V. Ltd.	3.1.2.0

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Conclusión

3 stages to protect digital systems

People process and technology: each must be leveraged to protect digital systems



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Process

- Policies and procedures are key for an effective security strategy
- Processes should adapt to changes as cyber threats evolve

Technology

- Technology is important in preventing and mitigating cyber risks
- Technology needs people, processes and procedures to mitigate risks

Cyber Security

In closing

Final Thoughts

“The right people will choose the right tools, but untrained people will use tools incorrectly even when they are the right ones.”

Robert M. Lee - 2016*



Questions



Contact

If you have further questions, please contact:

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ivan.granados@cl.abb.com

Links to:

- [Cyber Security on ABB.COM](#)

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